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THE RECIPROCAL TRADE PROGRAM

Mr. President, the Senate of the United States is considering what
could easily be the most vital piece of legislation in the 84th Congress
H. R. 1, a bill to extend and modify the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Program.

The course of action taken by the Senate may very well prove

to be the making or undoing of a strong foreign policy and a stable economy
in the United States and the world.

Congress must and I am sure

A

~/\will,

send to the White House a trade program which will cement the solidarity
of free nations and promote the economic stability of our own peoples .
The United States must take the leadership in liberating the free
world' s great economic potential.

This is imperative because we in America

have the political and economic power to lead the course of action.
What we do in the next few days may mean the success or failure
of our foreign trade policy.

The final form of H. R. 1 can mean prosperity,

high level of employment, a sound trade policy and a stable business
economy~:_

it can mean falling prices, unmanageable surpluses, unemploy-

ment and a slump in our domestic economy.
Since 1934 the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program has been an
essential part of our foreign economic policy.

An expansion of this program

i s in our own enlightened self-interest just as much as it is in the interest of
the peace and security of the other nations of the free world.
Since 1947 the Trade Agreements Act has been somewhat

11

diluted11 •

- 2 In that) ear an understanding .... as r ached b tw en C n re
and the State Department under wh1ch an
wrttten 1nto the agreements.

esc pe clau

Two years later came the

ton 1 t ad r
to

e

p nl p mt

provinon which requ1res that before reducmg any Lar1H duty the Prendent
must first secure the adv1ce of the Tart!! Commtss1on as to the pomts
beyond which he cannot reduce duttes without inJurmg dom •stic producers.
By 1951 both the ''peril point" proviSlons and the "eecape clauBc' were
incorporated in the Trade Agreements Act itself.

H. R. 1 repr ·sents a

modification of the present law and increases the President's power to
negotiate limited tariff cuts.
H. R. 1 provides the authority to reduce duties by 15 percent of
their July 1955 levels.

Another provision would allow the President to

reduce duties presently higher than 50 percent, to that ceiling.

An

additional provision gives the authority to lower duties to 50 percent of
their January l, 1945 levels on imports entcrmg in "negligible" quantit1es
only.

This is somewhat of a curtailment because under the present law

the President has the power lo

reduce~ duties

by this amount.

In

addition, the Senate Finance Committee has made other modification& and
compromises.
It is important to bear in mind that H. R. 1, hke the present law,

1s authorizing legislation only.

It would confer powers upon the President,

but its enactment, in and of itself, would not assure the reduction of a
single tar1If duty.
H. R. I has become the occasion !or an old-fashioned, knock-down,

- 3 drag-out "protectionist-free trade fight".

I think everyone is generally

familiar with the operation of the Trade Agreements Act so let us turn to
the two important is sues at stake in the free world, the effect of this trade
program on our domestic and foreign policies.
American industry has a big stake in export markets.

In 1953

we exported nearly 25 percent of our lubrication oil, nearly half of our
track-laying tractors and 36 percent of our civilian aircraft.

In addition,

9 percent of our anthracite coal, 10 percent of our tinplate, 10 percent of
our steel rails, 13 percent of our refrigerators and 31 percent of our construction and mining equipment found overseas markets last year.

Also

45 percent of our copper sulphate, 27 percent of penicillin, 55 percent of
rice, 31 percent of dried fruits and 6 0 percent of tallow.

For us to take

steps now which would endanger these exports would force many of the
industries into the most fundamental readjustments, and set off a wave of
repercussions which would affect our whole economy.
Even small local businesses share in the benefits of a high level
of foreign trade, because of the extra purchasing power placed in the
hands of workers in export industries.
There is much to be gained from increased trade.

As taxpayers

we benefit because more imports help reduce the need of other countries
for our aid.

As we all know, there has been extensive criticism of foreign

aid -- increased trade is one substitute which will not upset the applecart.
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Increased trade makes 1t posstble !or consumer
!ore1gn-madc goods that we need.

to p rc

Producers bene!tt, becau e

1

s
port

help foreigners earn the dollars they need to buy more Am :rtcan goods
wh1ch they need and want but cannot afford.

Fore1gn trade prom tes

more profttable American investments abroad.

All o! us bcncftt becau c

increased international trade creates a stronger free world and thereby
contributes to the possibilities for maintaining world peace.
The case for a sensible and practical foreign trade policy docs
not rest simply upon its impact on our need for friends and allies.
We ourselves stand to gam in economic terms if we choose the right
policy.

If we do not, we stand to suffer a heavy economic loss if we err.

In dollar terms , our foreign trade amounted to $37 billions in 1953; $16
billions of imports and $21 billions of exports.

This amounts to 5 or 6

percent of our total production which goes into export trade.

These

figures seem insignificant at first glance, but we cannot overlook the fact that
import s and exports, taken together, sustain 4-1/2 million Amt•rican jobs.
We forget that we are no longer self-sufficient; we must rely on foreign
sources for many of our critical raw materials and pleasures of life.
Fifty years ago we could close our eyes to the rest of the world and retreat
into our shell.

Not so today.

The world has become smaller through thP.

new and modern modes of transportation and communication.

Our population

is steadily increasing, our standard of living and consumption of raw and
finished materials continues to rise.
the free world 1! we are to survive.

We must cooperate w1th the rest of

- 5 As pointed out in the House Report on H. R . 1 there is probably
n o segment of our economy that has a greater stake in foreign trade than
agriculture.

It has been estimated that annual exports of agricultural

c o mmodities represent the production of from 50 to 60 million cultivated
acres.

Our agricultural exports provide a market for the produce of one

o ut of each 10 acres of cropland.

In 1951, when our agricultural exports

ran to $4 billion, this was the equivalent of $1 out of each $8 in cash
farm ·eceipts in the United States.
In 1953, of our total production we exported 45 percent of our
rice, 26 percent of our tobacco, 24 percent of our cotton, 21 percent
o f o ur s o ybeans and products, 19 pe:rcent of our wheat and flour, 18
percent of o ur lard, 17 percent of our barley, 6 percent of our raisins
and about 5 percent of our pears and apples.

It can be seen from these

statistics that we export about one-fourth of our total production of some
major agricultural commodities.
Since 1951, our agricultural exports have been falling off.

Any

time there is a falling off in exports of agricultural commodities, there
follows lower prices, increased surplus problems, and there may follow
acreage restrictions and marketing controls.

In many cases cropland is

diverted from production for export to production of other commodities for
d o mesti c consumption.
that are n o t exported
expo rts.

This means that even those agricultural commodities
can be directly affected as a result of a reduction in

One of the most 1mportanl

n wers to th

pr

agricultural surpluses is an expanded forc1gn market.

le

f

r

Under the trade-

agreements program, concess1ons have been obtamed for alm sl ev
a r1cultural product customar1ly exported from the Unit d Stale
Slgnificant amounts.

The enactment of a liberal trade program

T)

m an)
~ 11l

expand the foreign markets for agricultural products produced by
American farmers, which they need so badly.
It is frequently stated that future rcductlons in tariffs will

cause serious unemployment in particular industries by permitting
large volumes of 1mports to enter the United States, underselhng domest1c
production.
exaggerated.

The unemployment resulting from reduced tariffs 1s frequently
As I have already stated over 4 million jobs are attributable

to work generated by our foreign trade -- both export and import.

On the

other hand, it has been estimated that not: over 100, 000 workers nught be
threatened, directly or indirectly, with the loss of their jobs by increased
imports resulting from a hypothetical reduction across the board of 50
percent in present tariff rates.
In order to displace 5 million jobs there would have to be an
increase in imports of over $25 billion.

This is equal to twice our actual

imports and 4 times our dutiable imports.

(The $25 billion figure is

arrived at by taking the Department of Labor figure on the average value
of output per employee -- $5. 000 -- and multiplying by 5 million workers.)

- 7 Low tariff barriers have failed to depress labor standards and
wages in the United States at any time in our history and I don't think
they will now.

During the period that the trade-agreements program

has been in effect the people of the United States have achieved the
greatest prosperity this country has ever known.

Wages and working

conditions of our workers have steadily improved during this period
despite increased imports.
Opponents of the trade program often argue that tariff reductions
in industries essential to national defense in time of war endanger our
mobilization base.

They state that excessive imports can so reduce

domest' c production in these industries that capital investment declines
and skilled workers disappear into other lines of work, with the result
tha.t the rapid buildup necessary in an emergency would be impossible.
H. R. 1 calls for a selective, not an indiscriminate reduction of tariffs.
The President with his National Security Council and Department of
Defense retains his full responsibility for safeguarding the national
defense.
Since the introduction of H. R. l on the first day of the 84th
Congress, the Nation's Capital has been bombarded with "protectionist"
groups seeking to subordinate vital American interests to the creation
of privileged, non-competitive positions for a few industries.

If they

are allowed to succeed, these few seeking privileges will become many.
These protectionists would cut off many imports.

In short, they would

insist that we use up our own scarce resources rather than draw them to

- 8 the fullest economical extent from na tons m re wtlling to
own abundance.

These 1nterests would 1mpa r th

ell from

Adminietratt n 1

<"lr

po~ er

to grant ftrm tar1ff concessions to others in exchange for concess1ons to u .
The protection1st would, of course, 1mpose upon the consumer
the htgh prices that must always rule in a protected industl).

By stimu-

lating fears of imports, they attempt to divert attention from the need for
genuine remedies in situations of industrial weakness.
The vital question here is -- would higher tanf:fs actually
contribute to their strength or would it merely add an unnecessary
burden on the consuming public?

Tariffs do not necessarily give new

life to a dying industry; nor do they give life to an industry that is noncompetitive in the world market.

Higher tariffs are not a sure cure by

any means; they can easily increase and intensify the problems.
Too much emphasis is being placed on tariffs as a cure-all.
Industries can find much more shelter if they pursued the possibilities
of improved management, shifts in product lines, modernizing investment, withdrawal or relocation.
We should not freeze domestic production against all import
competition .

One of the great virtues of our individual enterprise system

is its adaptability, its ability to adjust to technological and other changes.
There are problem areas, 1 am among the first to admit this, but
higher tariffs will not help much.

In the case of hand blown glass, 1t has

- 9 been stated that we have more of an art than an industry and I am inclined
to agree.

It competes more on prestige and taste than price.

The hat

industry has reason to complain, but the United States Government cannot
insist that American men and women wear hats.
Perhaps the two most publicized instances of sick industries
are coal and textiles.

The coal industry needs help and we should do all

we can to help, but placing quotas on heavy fuel oil imports is not going
to be of any material help to the industry.
It has been pointed out to me that, should restrictions be placed

on the importation of heavy fuel oil, the existing work force would only
have to work 5 more days over the year or a total of 179 days to supply
the maximum amount of coal that the East Coast consumers could possibly
require should all who are able to do so convert to coal from heavy fuel oil.
These workers have in 1954 worked 3. 3 days per week, and consequently
we could not anticipate the reemployment of any coal miners who are now
unemployed.
The chief causes of coal's losses have been the dieselization
of railroads and the appeal of cleaner, more convenient fuels for home
heating.

The decline in use of coal by railroads between 1946 and 1953

amounted to 83 percent of the total decline in the United States use of
coal during this period.

The consumption of coal for space heating in

1953 was approximately half of that in 1946.

-1

Anoth r
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trade, coal producers can hardly exp ct to retam the export m rket they
have wh1le urgmg that heavy fuel 011 tmports be shut of!.

A un lat ral pro-

gram to the benef1t o! coal interests 1s 1mpo s1ble, so the) must rec1proc

t

In add1tion, natural gas has become a maJor competitor of both o1l
and coal.

The solution to the crisis in the coal industry 1s not quotas, ta.nffs

or a forced conversion back to coal.
Turning to textiles next we find another instance where the facts
need to be considered.
a few are sick.

There is not one textile industry but many, and only

Woolens and worsteds and carpets have b{'Cn sick .

and synthetics have not.

Cottons

We export 6 percent of our production of cotton

textiles and import the equivalent of only l /2 to l percent.

Our cotton tex-

tile industry is the most efficient and most innovating in the world.
temporary advantage in wages abroad will not upsel!_ht: industry.

Any

The

synthetic textiles are even better off.
Wool textiles are in a different status .
Many inefficient mills need to be reorganized.
ha r d.

They art• badly organized.
Synthetics hit the industry

From 1947 to 1953 there was a decline in sales of men's woolen suits

of 7 million units.

A high protected wool price, fluctuating widely, aggravated

by a bad situation .

I believe the solution probably lies in a system of

integrated woolen textile companies which can adjust flexibly to consumer
tastes and demands- -not in higher tariffs.

-ll-

When an industry fails to demonstrate actual injury they shift
to the argument--protection against cheaper labor costs abroad.
again is a baseless argument.

This

In the majority of cases, European industries•

cheap labor is not cheap at all, once the manufacturer calculates his costs
on a unit basis .

These foreign products may cost little by the hour, but

often they cost a great deal by the piece .

In most every industry, the

European pays two or three times more for his capital than his American
competitor .

In every industry, his power costs are higher; in most

industries, his raw material costs are higher too .

Almost universally,

he does his business on a scale so small that he cannot begin to equal
the economies of our industries.

Arxi finally, he often operates in an

environment saddled with the restrictions of the cartel, where the incentive
to cut costs is weak and diffused.
benefits too .

His wage costs are multiplied by fringe

With these handicaps, I think the European who can match

our prices in our market is a man to be admired.

One additional fact--

American industries, large and small, have been able to out sell Europeans
even in their own home territory.
We cannot freeze domestic production against all import competition.
One of the great virtues of our individual enterprise system is its
adapatability, its ability to adjust to the technological and other changes .
Imports naturally will create competition.

In some cases such

imports might displace a few workers and firms, yet the imports might be
essential to the national interest.

Adjustments will have to be made .

-12-

Adjustments can be made through legislation at Federal and State levels .
There are many things that can be done which will cushion the impact of
justi!ied foreign imports--increased unemployment compensation benc!its,
advance the age of retirement, provide re-training for younger workers,
provide moving allowances , increase the lending power of the Small Business Administration, provide engineering assistance and marketing addce
to firms finding it necessary to adjust their operations , to mention only a
!ew possible approaches .
We are living today in a divided world, the free and the enslaved,
with the two parts engaged in a competitive struggle to prove the superiority
of their respective systems.

Economic solidarity on our side in this

struggle is imperative if we arc to maintain our position and increase our
influence in those parts of the world which arc yet uncommitted.

Now to

proclaim, by failure of our trade system , that we are ending our policy of
cooperation in trade and tariff matters , in favor of protectionism, would
drive a wedge in Western economic unity which would go far to undo all
the great efforts we have made in the last few years to build strength and
vitality in our part of the world, through the Mar shall Plan, Point Four
and other economic and military aid programs.
Our free world friends have made great strides since the war in
regaining their econonric strength, aided in substantial measure by United
S tates assistance.

As their economic health has returned they have been

-13-

faced increasingly with a dilemma whether they can confidently rely on the
United States for an expanding two-way trade with their exports and as a
source for their necessary imports.

If we do not make it possible for them

to develop their trade with us they may be forced by the economic facts
of life to yield to the inducements of the East and become more and more
dependent upon trade with that bloc.

The danger to us and to them of a

development along this line is so obvious that it needs no emphasis.

Economic

dependence can become political dependence and our laboriously built system
of free world alliances could easily begin to disintegrate while we stand
helplessly by.
The days of economic aid, except for certain particular areas,
are just about over but the dollar gaps remain, concealed to some extent
by our extraordinary military aid and military expenditures abroad.

As

these taper off, as we plan they should, the gap will become apparent
again and we shall be faced with the alternatives of continuing some sort
of aid program, reconciling ourselves to a reduction in our exports which
foreign countries will still need, or accepting more imports.

The last

alternative can be mitigated considerably by increases in United States
foreign investment.

A general increase in trade , including triangular

trade made possible through greater currency convertibility, will enable
all of us to expand our economies and our output and at the same time
contribute to the removal of the currency imbalances.

An essential element

in any such development would be, however, a liberal United States trade

-1-4-

pohcy and a Wllhngness on the part of th
the econonuc sphere.

Un1t d Stat

Renewal of the Rec1procal Trad

to coop r t
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full~

n

ment 1 J:P 1

tion must be a 1ntegral part of the cooperation.
In recent months Formosa and the offshore islands have hade the

maJOr part of the attention of our fore1gn policy interests.

While we ha.\"'

been pre-occup1ed with the Formosa Straits we have come close to los1ng
an outpost in Asia far more important than Formosa--Japan.

We have been

striving to build up Japan as a bastion of United States and free world defense
in Asia .

But the Japanese still face a desperate econom1c situation.

Japan

must sustain 88 million people in an area smaller than Montana, with few
natural resources and only 16 percent of its land arable .

As an industrial

and island economy, Japan must import raw materials and export the
manufactured goods .

In short, Japan -- like Great Britain-- must trade

to live .
We want the Japanese to limit their trade with Communist China
for strategic reasons .

But to compensate for its former large trade with

m a inland China, Jap an must find greater outlets in the free world.
This , in my judgement, is a deadly serious 1ssue .

The world

must open its markets to Japan or risk the greatest industrial nation in
A sia slipping into the Communist orbit -- either by the sheer necessity
of trading with the Chinese Communists, or by growing economic distress
leading to internal Communist subversion.

-15It is essential that Japan be kept within the orbit of the free world.
In a very real sense, an economically strong Japan is an integral part of the

defense system of the United States in the Pacific.

There is no assurance,

of course, that the strengthening of Japan, tr a de -wise, will automatically
hold Japan in the free world orbit.

But, the opposite is a foregone conclusion;

if the free world closes its markets to Japanese goods.
will trade with the Communist bloc.

Japan inevitably

For, Japan must trade .

Japan 1 s natural markets, to be sure, are in the Orient, but at the
present time the only Asiatic countries with whom she can trade in volume
are Communist controlled.

Eventually, perhaps, Japan will be able to rely

on her Asiatic neighbors for markets.

This area, however, is presently

unde rdeveloped, and until it becomes developed the countries of the West,
particularly the United States, Canada and Western Europe, will have to be
willing to take their fair share of Japanese merchandise.

Figures for

January-October 1954 show that the United States exported $758, 857, 000
in goods and produce to Japan.

In return, during the same period we im-

ported Japanese products valued at $221, 366, 000.

If we lost our Japanese

markets we would be losing a very valuable source of income. If we cut
off the Japanese imports, we certainly cannot expect to maintain the Japanese
market for our goods.

Oriental imports may hurt several of our smaller

industr i es, but in light of the overall picture, should we sacrifice a
$750, 000, 000 market and an ally for the sake of several small industries

-16that can be helped by other methods, adJu t:mcnts, r loc uon and com r
It

1s

not my intention to g1vc the 1mpress10n that th

States 1s the only nat1on which needs to revise 1ts t:rad
!rom it.

Um.ted

regul tion , f r

I! freer trade is to be worthwhile other nations will have to

remove trade restrictions .

But because of the dom:rna:nt role of our

economy in the world system, we must participate in the chm1nation of
restrictions, and it is important that we be among the first to t.ak" the
necessary steps .
Freeing trade won ' t cure all the world ' s economic maladies.
Underdeveloped areas , for example , will need economic ass1Stance
for a long time to come .

But United States leader ship in reducing

trade barriers may, in addition to its economic effects, remove a
convenient scapegoat on which some nations have fallen back in mak1ng
excuses for not putting their own economies in order.

United States

action in this matter will also rob Communists of a propaganda weapon
to use against the United S tates.
Freer trade between the nations of the free world with their
abundance of resources and skills WJ.ll increase opportunities and
standards of living everywhere.

To reverse the trends of the last

20 years now and return to policies of restrictionsim and protectionism
would lead to rigidity and stagnation in our economic hfc .

on.

- 17 In addition we need our friends and allies as much as they need
us; we should not let any part of the free world go by default.
Many countries view us almost entirely through our trade policy.
We are the chief market for Swiss watches, for Scotch whisky, for Cuban
sugar; Spain sends up three-quarters of her pickled olives; Portugal sends
us forty percent of her cork.

It is easy to lose sight of cork in all the trade

statistics, but you can be very sure that Portugal does not lose sight of it.
When we raise the tariff on a foreign product, we not only hurt a good
customer, we cut down sharply on what the nation can buy here and at the
same time we give deadly ammunition to our enemies, who live by
poisoning the minds of our allies .
In the last analysis, we are all in the same boat .

This is true

not only of Americans, but of millions of people around the world who
trade with us, who share in the common defense and who are trying to
make a success of democracy.
When we hurt a neighbor•s trade , we hurt his capacity and hi s
will to be strong .

A poor nation cannot afford defense; and when its

citizens feel they have nothing to defend, it is no longer an ally, but a
liability.
We have come to the crossroads -- we must make a choice now
whether we will lead the free world forward to widening markets and
expanding production, or permit it to lapse into intensified economic
nationalism and political division .

The adoption of a clear - cut policy of

- 1
tarl!f hb r hzation would pro" de fr
ire

1m et

world from cr1pphng econom1c re tricuon
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It v. uld b
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a pow r

stimulant to other free nations to hberabzc the1r own trad

1

and

move toward currency convertib1hty.
On the other hand, our failure to assert such 1 ader hlp v.ould
be interpreted by our allies as a retreat from our present fore1gn poliq.
An increased and freer flow of trade among the free nations

•

would promote the most economical use of our own resources -- just as l l would
promote the most economical usc of our alhes ' resources . It would enable
the United States to concentrate on producing those things we make most
efficiently - - and to excha nge a part of our efficient production for the things
we need which other people make more efficiently than we can.
It is just common sense for us to trade typewriters or refrigerators

for cof!ec or bananas - - rather than try to produce the latter ourselves at
exorbitant costs .
The s uccess or fa ilure of America's future in the world depends
more than we realize on the final form of this one piece of legislation, H . R . l.
I sincerely hope th a t we a dopt the avenue to a prosperous future, embodied m
a liberal trade policy .
In closing I think that a quotation from the President would be most
appropriate, "If we fail in our trade policy, we may fail in all. 11

